Executive Functions and Improvement of Thinking: An Intervention Program to Enhance Deductive Reasoning Abilities.

Empirical and theoretical advances and application to society are moved at different speed. Application work is frequently developed later because it requires the integration of knowledge from different research areas. In the present paper, we integrate literature coming from diverse areas of research in order to design a deductive reasoning intervention, based on the involved executive functions. Executive functions include working memory (WM)'s online executive processes and other off-line functions such as task revising and planning. Deductive reasoning is a sequential thinking process driven by reasoners' meta-deductive knowledge and goals that requires the construction and manipulation of representations. We present a new theoretical view about the relationship between executive function and higher-level thinking, a critical analysis of the possibilities and limitations of cognitive training, and a metacognitive training procedure on executive functions to improve deductive reasoning. This procedure integrates direct instruction on deduction and meta-deductive concepts (consistency, necessity) and strategies (search for counterexamples and exhaustivity), together with the simultaneous training of WM and executive functions involved: Focus and switch attention, update WM representations, inhibit and revise intuitive responses, and control the emotional stress yielded by tasks. Likewise, it includes direct training of some complex WM tasks that demands people to carry out similar cognitive assignment than deduction. Our training program would be included in the school curriculum and attempts not only to improve deductive reasoning in experimental tasks, but also to increase students' ability to uncover fallacies in discourse, to automatize some basic logical skills, and to be able to use logical intuitions.

Inferences from the negation of counterfactual and semifactual conditionals.

Our goal was to study how people understand the negation of counterfactuals (such as "Antonio denied/said that it is false that if Messi had played, then Barcelona would have won") and semifactuals (such as "Antonio denied that even if Messi had played, Barcelona would have won"). Previous studies have shown that participants negated basic conditionals using small-scope interpretations by endorsing a new conditional with the negated consequent, but also by making large-scope interpretations, endorsing a conjunction with the negated consequent. Three experiments showed that when participants were asked whether the negation of a counterfactual (Experiments 1 and 2) or semifactual (Experiment 3) conditional was followed by a new conditional, they made a small-scope interpretation, endorsing the same conditional with the negated consequent (e.g., "if/even if Messi had played, Barcelona would not have won"). However, they also accepted the conditional with the negated antecedent for semifactuals (e.g., "even if Messi had not played, Barcelona would have won"). When participants were asked whether the negation of a counterfactual or semifactual conditional is followed by a conjunction, they endorsed the conjunction with both the negated antecedent and the consequent (e.g., "Messi did not play and Barcelona did not win"), but again they accepted the conjunction with the negated antecedent only for semifactuals (e.g., "Messi did not play and Barcelona did win"). These results have implications for the main theories of reasoning.

Similarities and differences in understanding negative and affirmative counterfactuals and causal assertions: Evidence from eye-tracking.

Two eye-tracking experiments compared affirmative and negative counterfactuals, "if she had (not) arrived early, she would (not) have bought roses" and affirmative and negative causal assertions, "Because she arrived (did not arrive) early, she bought (did not buy) roses." When participants heard a counterfactual, they looked on screen at words corresponding to its conjecture ("roses"), and its presupposed facts ("no roses"), whereas for a causal assertion, they looked only at words corresponding to the facts. For counterfactuals, they looked at the conjecture first, and later the presupposed facts, and at the latter more than the former. The effect was more pronounced for negative counterfactuals than affirmative ones because the negative counterfactual's presupposed facts identify a specific item ("she bought roses"), whereas the affirmative counterfactual's presupposed facts do not ("she did not buy roses"). Hence, when participants were given a binary context, "she did not know whether to buy roses or carnations," they looked primarily at the presupposed facts for both sorts of counterfactuals. We discuss the implications for theories of negation, the dual meaning of counterfactuals, and their relation to causal assertions.

Executive Functions and Improvement of Thinking: An Intervention Program to Enhance Deductive Reasoning Abilities

Empirical and theoretical advances and application to society are moved at different speed. Application work is frequently developed later because it requires the integration of knowledge from different research areas. In the present paper, we integrate literature coming from diverse areas of research in order to design a deductive reasoning intervention, based on the involved executive functions. Executive functions include working memory (WM)’s online executive processes and other off-line functions such as task revising and planning. Deductive reasoning is a sequential thinking process driven by reasoners’ meta-deductive knowledge and goals that requires the construction and manipulation of representations. We present a new theoretical view about the relationship between executive function and higher-level thinking, a critical analysis of the possibilities and limitations of cognitive training, and a metacognitive training procedure on executive functions to improve deductive reasoning. This procedure integrates direct instruction on deduction and meta-deductive concepts (consistency, necessity) and strategies (search for counterexamples and exhaustivity), together with the simultaneous training of WM and executive functions involved: Focus and switch attention, update WM representations, inhibit and revise intuitive responses, and control the emotional stress yielded by tasks. Likewise, it includes direct training of some complex WM tasks that demands people to carry out similar cognitive assignment than deduction. Our training program would be included in the school curriculum and attempts not only to improve deductive reasoning in experimental tasks, but also to increase students’ ability to uncover fallacies in discourse, to automatize some basic logical skills, and to be able to use logical intuitions. (AU)

"Looking at" Negation: Faster Processing for Symbolic Rather Than Iconic Representations.

Many studies have shown the double processing of negation, suggesting that negation integration into sentence meaning is delayed. This contrasts with some researches that have found that such integration is rather immediate. The present study contributes to this debate. Affirmative and negative compound sentences (e.g., "because he was not hungry, he did not order a salad") were presented orally in a visual world paradigm while four printed words were on the screen: salad, no salad, soup, and no soup. The eye-tracking data showed two different fixation patterns for negative causal assertions, which are linked to differences in the representation and inferential demands. One indicates that negation is integrated immediately, as people look at the explicit negation (e.g., no salad) very early. The other, in which people look at the alternate (e.g., soup) much later, indicates that what is delayed in time is the representation of the alternate. These results support theories that combine iconic and symbolic representations, such as the model theory.

The Comprehension of Counterfactual Conditionals: Evidence From Eye-Tracking in the Visual World Paradigm.

Three experiments tracked participants' eye-movements to examine the time course of comprehension of the dual meaning of counterfactuals, such as "if there had been oranges then there would have been pears." Participants listened to conditionals while looking at images in the visual world paradigm, including an image of oranges and pears that corresponds to the counterfactual's conjecture, and one of no oranges and no pears that corresponds to its presumed facts, to establish at what point in time they consider each one. The results revealed striking individual differences: some participants looked at the negative image and the affirmative one, and some only at the affirmative image. The first experiment showed that participants who looked at the negative image increased their fixation on it within half a second. The second experiment showed they do so even without explicit instructions, and the third showed they do so even for printed words.

Negation in context: Evidence from the visual world paradigm.

Literature assumes that negation is more difficult to understand than affirmation, but this might depend on the pragmatic context. The goal of this paper is to show that pragmatic knowledge modulates the unfolding processing of negation due to the previous activation of the negated situation. To test this, we used the visual world paradigm. In this task, we presented affirmative (e.g., her dad was rich) and negative sentences (e.g., her dad was not poor) while viewing two images of the affirmed and denied entities. The critical sentence in each item was preceded by one of three types of contexts: an inconsistent context (e.g., She supposed that her dad had little savings) that activates the negated situation (a poor man), a consistent context (e.g., She supposed that her dad had enough savings) that activates the actual situation (a rich man), or a neutral context (e.g., her dad lived on the other side of town) that activates neither of the two models previously suggested. The results corroborated our hypothesis. Pragmatics is implicated in the unfolding processing of negation. We found an increase in fixations on the target compared to the baseline for negative sentences at 800 ms in the neutral context, 600 ms in the inconsistent context, and 1450 ms in the consistent context. Thus, when the negated situation has been previously introduced via an inconsistent context, negation is facilitated.

Visual content of words delays negation.

Many studies have shown the advantage of processing visualizable words over non-visualizables due to the associated image code. The present paper reports the case of negation in which imagery could slow down processing. Negation reverses the truth value of a proposition from false to true or vice versa. Consequently, negation works only on propositions (reversing their truth value) and cannot apply directly to other forms of knowledge representation such as images (although they can be veridical or not). This leads to a paradoxical hypothesis: despite the advantage of visualizable words for general processing, the negation of clauses containing words related to the representation of an image would be more difficult than negation containing non-visualizable words. Two experiments support this hypothesis by showing that sentences with a previously negated visualizable word took longer to be read than sentences with previously negated non-visualizable words. The results suggest that a verbal code is used to process negation.

The negations of conjunctions, conditionals, and disjunctions.

How do reasoners understand and formulate denials of compound assertions, such as conjunctions and disjunctions? A theory based on mental models postulates that individuals enumerate models of the various possibilities consistent with the assertions. It therefore predicts a novel interaction: in affirmations, conjunctions, A and B, which refer to one possibility, should be easier to understand than disjunctions, A or B, which refer to more than one possibility; in denials, conjunctions, not(A and B), which refer to more than one possibility, should be harder to understand than disjunctions, not(A or B), which do not. Conditionals are ambiguous and they should be of intermediate difficulty. Experiment 1 corroborated this trend with a task in which the participants selected which possibilities were consistent with assertions, such as: Bob denied that he wore a yellow shirt and he wore blue pants on Tuesday. Experiment 2 likewise showed that participants' own formulations of verbal denials yielded the same trend in which denials of conjunctions were harder than denials of conditionals, which in turn were harder than denials of disjunctions.

Schizotypal people stick longer to their first choices.

Many studies have reported that schizophrenic patients show a Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence (BADE). This cognitive bias has been related to the formation and maintenance of delusion. The aim of this paper was to study whether BADE was present in healthy people displaying psychometric schizotypy, and to compare a closure task, which has been used for schizophrenia, with a new chronometric paradigm. Results with the new paradigm showed that the high-schizotypy group maintained their initial hypotheses longer than the low-schizotypy group. This finding corroborated the similarities between schizophrenic disorder and schizotypal traits, in this case with respect to the BADE. Research of this kind could facilitate the study of cognition in the schizophrenic spectrum without the difficulties of working with schizophrenic patients for some tasks and the assessment and early intervention in at-risk populations.